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1. Introduction
Consider a principle of modal plenitude according to which whatever
could exist, does exist. Since an oak tree could have grown from an
acorn from which no tree ever results, something exists which could
have grown into an oak tree from the given acorn. Two philosophers
who have recently developed the thought in different directions are
David Lewis and Timothy Williamson. According to Lewis (1986),
when we let our quantifiers range unrestrictedly over all there is, we
quantify over merely possible objects as well as actual ones. If it’s
merely possible for an oak tree to grow from the given acorn, then
some concrete universe, which is causally and spatiotemporally iso-
lated from the actual world, contains, as a part, an oak tree originated
from (a counterpart of) the acorn. Williamson (2013), in contrast, ar-
gues for all modal closures of the Barcan Formula:
(BF) 3∃x A→ ∃x3 A.1
Since it’s possible for something to be an oak tree originated from a
given acorn, something is possibly an oak tree originated from the
acorn. One difference between Lewis and Williamson is that the latter
takes exception to the further claim that a possible oak tree need ac-
tually be an oak tree; a merely possible oak tree is best conceived as
a non-concrete object, which could have nevertheless been a concrete
oak tree. Despite important differences, Lewis and Williamson stand
united by the thought that when appropriately unrestricted, our quan-
tifiers range over a vast infinity of possibly concrete objects. In general,
if there could have been at least κ concrete objects, then there are κ
possible concrete objects. This profligate ontology may strike one as
metaphysically extravagant, but another serious problem is that they
provide an inhospitable environment for recombination principles.
1. A modal closure of a formula A is one that results from prefixing A with a
finite sequence (which may be the null sequence) of universal quantifiers and
necessity operators.
gabriel uzquiano Recombination and paradox
There is, first, an apparent tension between certain principles of
recombination and the iterative conception of set, which motivates
most of the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice and
urelements (ZFCU). On the iterative conception, sets are formed in cu-
mulative stages of an iterative hierarchy, which begins with an initial
domain of nonsets, otherwise known as “urelements”. But while the
iterative conception invites us to form a set of urelements at the very
first stage of the iteration, modal plenitude yields far more urelements
than can be collected into a set. Inspired by Nolan (1996), Sider (2009)
and Menzel (2014) make the point by appeal to a consequence of unre-
stricted recombination:
(RC1) For each cardinal number κ, it is possible that there are at least
κ urelements.2
This principle enjoys general appeal, even if neither Lewis nor
Williamson are officially committed to it. For to deny it is to posit
an arbitrary and unmotivated constrain on the cardinality urelements
could have. Now, if whatever could exist does exist, then, given (RC1):
(U∞) For each cardinal number κ, there are at least κ possible urele-
ments.3
But it turns out that (U∞) precludes the existence of a set of all
urelements over ZFCU.4 To the extent to which such a set may be
2. The original principle of recombination comes from Lewis (1986) and states
that given some objects, there is a world which contains any number of du-
plicates of any of them. Lewis eventually qualifies the principle to include the
clause: “size and shape permitting”. Nolan (1996) argues that Lewis’ restriction
is unmotivated and invites him to consider an unqualified form of recombina-
tion from which (RC1) would be a consequence.
3. The argument involves auxiliary assumptions, e.g., no merely possible ure-
lement is a set. Sider (2009) offers a careful regimentation of all the premises.
4. If A is the set of all urelements, then the cardinality of A will, in ZFCU,
be given by some cardinal number κ. By (U∞), there is a set of urelements of
cardinality κ+, i.e., the successor of κ, which will have strictly larger cardinality
than A. So, A cannot be a set of all urelements after all. More generally, no set
of urelements contains all urelements, on pain of contradiction.
required by the iterative conception, we have a problem for modal
plenitude.
There is, in addition, a conflict between certain principles of recom-
bination and the Cantorian doctrine of the absolutely infinite. Georg
Cantor, the founder of set theory, relied on a distinction between “trans-
finite multiplicities,” which are mathematically tractable and form sets,
and “absolutely infinite multiplicities,” which are mathematically in-
tractable and exemplify an unsurpassable magnitude, an “absolute
maximum” (Cantor, 1932, p. 405):
The transfinite, with its wealth of arrangements and forms,
points with necessity to an absolute, ot the ‘true infinite’, whose
magnitude is not subject to any increase or reduction, and for
this reason it must be quantitatively conceived as an absolute
maximum.
While Cantor’s distinction is mathematically fruitful and admittedly
suggestive, it bears clarification.
One way to make the Cantorian thought precise is due to John von
Neumann, who transformed it into a maximality principle according to
which that a multiplicity forms a set if and only if it is not in one-one
correspondence with all the objects there are.5
The problem, as developed by Hawthorne and Uzquiano (2011),
concerns a recombination principle for angels conceived as objects ca-
pable of co-location in point-sized regions.6 In general:
(RC2) For each cardinal κ, it is possible that there are at least κ angels.
5. This is Axiom IV.2 in an axiomatization developed in von Neumann (1925)
and von Neumann (1928).
6. Without theological overtones, the problem can be formulated in terms of
a recombination principle for objects capable of co-location, e.g., elementary
particles like bosons. This requirement is meant to bypass Lewis’s qualification
of the principle of recombination “size and shape permitting”: no matter how
large κ may be, the existence of κ co-located objects will not pose stringent
demands on the size or shape of spacetime.
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But if whatever could exist does exist, then, given (RC2), we have:
(A∞) For each cardinal number κ, there are at least κ possible angels.
In Cantorian jargon, the possible angels form an “absolutely infinite
multiplicity” exemplifying an absolute quantitative maximum. But
given reasonable assumptions, the operation of mereological fusion
generates strictly more fusions of possible angels than there are possi-
ble angels.7 Hence:
(A∞+ ) There are strictly more fusions of possible angels than there are
possible angels.
This means that there are at least two absolutely infinite magnitudes
providing a clear-cut counterexample to von Neumann’s maximality
interpretation of the Cantorian doctrine.
One may be tempted to dismiss the difficulty as a byproduct of
the ontological profligacy of modal plenitude: when combined with
it, attractive recombination principles commit one to a vast plethora
of merely possible concrete objects, one which would be objectionable
from the standpoint of more sober accounts of modal discourse.8 Con-
sider, for example, an account of modal discourse governed by an ab-
stractionist interpretation of the schema (3) on which possible worlds
are conceived as abstract objects of one sort or another:9
(3) It is possible that A if, and only if, the proposition that A is true
at some possible world w.
7. In Hawthorne and Uzquiano (2011), this claim is derived from the weaker
assumption that no one object fuses two different multiciplicities of possible
angels and the principle of unrestricted composition according to which no
matter what some objects may be, there is a fusion of them.
8. It is little help to deny that merely possible objects exist and then posit
individuals essences that serve as surrogates for them. See the papers collected
in Plantinga (2003).
9. I borrow the label ‘abstractionist’ from van Inwagen (1986). They stand in
contrast with the modal realist interpretation of (3).
Possible worlds have been conceived as states of affairs (Plantinga
(1976)), maximal consistent sets of propositions (Adams (1974) and
Adams (1974)), total propositions, (Fine (1977)), and maximal ways the
universe might have been (Kripke (1980) and Stalnaker (1976)). What-
ever the choice, one may dismiss talk of merely possible objects as a
colorful façon de parler: if no oak tree ever grows from an acorn, then
nothing exists which could have developed into an oak tree from the
given acorn. There is, after all, a difference between “it is possible that
some oak tree might have developed from a given acorn”—in which
the quantifier lies within the scope of the modal operator—and “some
object could have developed from a given acorn ”—which does, in fact,
commit one to the existence of a possible oak tree. Now, without the
extravagant commitment to extraordinarily large infinities of possibly
concrete objects, they may hope to avoid the tension with the Cantorian
doctrine of the absolutely infinite.
This would be a mistake. Lewis and Williamson are not alone in
their predicament. We set out to argue that a parallel challenge is quite
independent from modal plenitude. In particular, we’ll suggest that,
given reasonable assumptions, a recombination principle in the spirit
of (RC1) and (RC2) entails the existence of at least two absolutely infi-
nite magnitudes. The challenge from recombination poses a distinctive
difficulty for a large family of accounts of modal discourse, one that
is importantly different from more traditional threats of paradox ex-
emplified by modern descendants of Russell’s paradox of propositions
and Kaplan’s paradox.10 They each require a different set of resources,
and while there is little agreement as to how best to respond to them,
common reactions to them are ineffectual when it comes to the chal-
lenge from recombination.
2. Methodological preliminaries
We introduce the framework for the problem from recombination.
10. Russell’s paradox comes from appendix B of Russell (1903), and Kaplan’s
paradox is developed in Kaplan (1995).
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2.1 ZFCU
The axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC) provide
a standard axiomatization of pure set theory, where one takes the vari-
ables to be tacitly restricted to sets. In the language of ZFCU, we lift
the restriction and introduce an additional primitive predicate, Set(x),
read: “x is a set”.11 This predicate is governed by the axiom:
(1) ∀x∀y(y ∈ x → Set(x))
The axioms of ZFCU require minor modifications on the axioms of
ZFC. One change with respect to ZFC is the relativization of the axiom
of extensionality to apply to sets. Extensionality now reads:
Axiom of Extensionality:
(2) ∀x∀y((Set(x) ∧ Set(y))→ ∀z((z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y)).
Other axioms are counterparts of separation and pair, union, and
power set axioms. The empty set axiom and the axiom of infinity state
the unconditional existence of an empty set and an infinite set, and
the axioms of replacement make sure that if some objects are in one-
one correspondence with the elements of a set, then they themselves
form a set. There are, in addition, axioms of choice and foundation.
One version of the axiom of choice states that given a family of disjoint
non-empty sets, there is a “choice set” containing exactly one element
from each set in the family. The axiom of foundation requires sets to
appear at cumulative ranks of a familiar cumulative hierarchy.
The axioms of ZFCU leave open whether a set contains all urele-
ments, but it is not uncommon to assume that there is one.12 In this
11. Impure set theory may be developed in different ways; Jech (2013), for ex-
ample, expands the language of ZFC with a constant symbol, A, for the set of
urelements and makes alternative modifications to the axioms of ZFC.
12. Jech (2013), for example, expands the language of ZFC with a constant, A,
intended to denote a set of ur-elmements.
framework, one option is to supplement ZFCU with the axiom that
there is a set of all urelements:
The Urelement Set Axiom:
(3) ∃x(Set(x) ∧ ∀y(¬Set(y)→ y ∈ x)).13
There is, however, no mathematical difficulty associated with the devel-
opment of ZFCU without the Urelement Set Axiom.14 Some axiomati-
zations of impure set theory explicitly rule out the existence of a set of
urelements at the outset in order to make sure that they exist in great
abundance.15
2.2 The iterative conception
The iterative conception of set motivates many of the axioms of
ZFCU.16 On the iterative conception, sets are formed in stages of a
cumulative hierarchy from an initial domain of urelements by itera-
tion of the operation “set of”. In the words of Kurt Gödel in (Gödel,
1947, 180):
The concept of set, however, according to which a set is anything
obtainable from the integers (or some other well-defined objects)
by iterated application of the operation “set of”, and not some-
thing obtained by dividing the totality of all existing things into
two categories, has never led to any antinomy whatsoever; that
is, the perfectly “naive” and uncritical working with this concept
of set has so far proved self-consistent.
13. McGee (1997) discusses the credentials of this axiom in detail.
14. In Barwise (1975), KPU is Kripke-Platek set theory with urelements and
KPU+ is the theory augmented with the Urelement Set Axiom.
15. Two examples are given by Barwise and Moss (1996) and Friedman (2004).
16. According to Boolos (1989), neither choice nor replacement fall out of the
iterative conception of set.
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At the first stage, we obtain sets of urelements—which include the
empty set. At subsequent stages—which may be successor or limit
stages, we obtain sets from urelements and sets formed in earlier
stages. This narrative makes vivid a familiar cumulative hierarchy:
U0 = U;
Uα+1 = Uα ∪ P(Uα);
Uλ =
⋃
α<λ
Uα, for λ a limit ordinal.
On this model of the iterative conception, a set of urelements, U, is
formed at the first stage of iteration. In general, if κ is a strongly in-
accessible cardinal, 〈⋃Uκ ,∈ ⋃Uκ〉 yields a model of ZFCU + The
Urelement Set Axiom in which Set is interpreted to apply to
⋃
Uκ −U.
As expected, (U∞) is falsified in models of this form.
We face a fork in the road. One option at this point is to make ad-
justments in the axioms of ZFCU in order to block the inconsistency
of (U∞) and the Urelement Set Axiom. The other option is to revert
to a more liberal interpretation of the iterative conception on which
the urelements are no longer required to form a set. Menzel (2014) has
explored the prospects of the first option in great detail. His modifica-
tion of ZFCU is intended to accommodate the existence of “wide sets”,
which, while formed at low stages of the cumulative hierarchy, are not
“mathematically determinable”. The axioms of replacement and power
set, in particular, are appropriately restricted in order to accommodate
them.17
17. Replacement is restricted to the claim that, roughly, only the range of an
operation F on mathematically determinable sets determines a set. The axiom
of power set is similarly stated as the claim that for every set a, there is a set
which contains all and only the “mathematically determinable” subsets of a.
The proposal requires two more axioms intended to enforce the existence of a
partition of the universe into ranks and the thought that only mathematically
determinable sets admit an increase in cardinality.
The second option is suggested by Ernst Zermelo’s characteriza-
tion of normal domains as cumulative models of second-order ZFCU in
Zermelo (1930). A normal domain is completely determined by two
parameters: one is the cardinality of the basis of urelements, and the
other is the characteristic of the model, i.e., the supremum of ordinal
numbers represented in the model. If U is a basis and κ is the char-
acteristic of a normal domain, then, in second-order ZFCU, we may
recursively define the ranks:
U0 = U;
Uα+1 = Uα ∪ {x : x ⊆ Uα};
Uλ =
⋃
α<λ
Uα, for λ a limit ordinal.
The normal domain determined by U and κ corresponds to a model,
〈⋃Uκ ,∈ ⋃Uκ〉, of ZFCU in which Set is interpreted in terms of⋃
Uκ − U. In general, Zermelo proved that a subset X of a normal
domain of characteristic κ is represented by a set in the model if, and
only if |X| < κ. So, the Urelement Set Axiom is falsified in normal
domains in which the cardinality of U is strictly larger than the char-
acteristic κ of the model.18 When this is the case, in fact, none of the
stages Uα are represented by a set in the model. There is, nonetheless,
a clear sense in which sets are formed in stages of a cumulative hier-
archy. The construction models the iteration of the “set of” operation,
which turns “mathematically determinable” multiplicities into sets.19
So, (U∞) is consistent with the core of the iterative conception.
18. This is Proposition 4 in Kanamori (2004).
19. A mathematically determinable multiplicity is one counted by a cardinal
represented in the model.
philosophers’ imprint - 5 - vol. 999, no. 999 (july 2015)
gabriel uzquiano Recombination and paradox
2.3 The absolutely infinite
Zermelo often speaks of the set-theoretic universe as a merely potential
succession of normal domains never reaching completion. Cantor, in
contrast, conceived the set-theoretic universe as a completed “absolute
infinity” that is beyond mathematical determination. He went on to
make a distinction between “transfinite” or “consistent multiplicities,”
capable of mathematical determination, and “absolutely infinite” or
“inconsistent multiplicities”, which are mathematically intractable.
Cantor’s distinction is now mirrored by a distinction between sets
and classes. What we learn from the set-theoretic antinomies is that
some classes, e.g., the class of non-self-membered sets, fail to form a
set. Sets have “elements”, but classes have “members”. Classes, like
sets, are extensional in nature, but, unlike sets, they are never allowed
to be members. When classes are reified as set-like objects, these dif-
ferences become inexplicable. Perhaps one reason to tolerate them is
that classes have important applications in set theory: they allow one
to turn separation and replacement into single axioms; they play a cru-
cial role in the motivation and formulation of certain large cardinal
axioms; and they are often invoked in set-theoretic argumentation.20
But whatever benefits classes are supposed to bring with them, talk of
classes is hardly credible when conceived as set-like objects.
There is, however, no need to reify classes. No matter how conve-
nient it may seem, talk of classes is best conceived as shorthand for talk
that would have been expressed more perspicuously by metalinguistic
ascent or by means of plural quantification over sets.21 This is the offi-
cial position we adopt in the paper. The challenge from recombination
20. Maddy (1983) discusses the role of classes in set theory.
21. The difference between the two strategies of paraphrase is not without sig-
nificance. The metalinguistic intepretation in terms of satisfaction in line with
Parsons (1974) affords an intepretation of a predicative theory of classes like
Bernays-Gödel class theory (BG), whereas the plural interpretation helps one
make sense of an impredicative theory of classes like Morse-Kelley class the-
ory (MK). One way in which talk of predicative classes is innocuous is borne
out by the fact that BG is a conservative extension of ZFC: a sentence A of the
language of ZFC is a theorem of BG only if it is a theorem of ZFC.
takes place within a two-sorted extenson of Bernays-Gödel class theory
with urelements (BGU), which is a predicative theory of classes over
ZFCU.22 The language of BGU contains uppercase variables X, Y, Z, ...
for classes and lowercase variables x, y, z, ... for urelements and sets.
The other change with respect to ZFCU is that we let the ∈ be flanked
by a set and a class variable, e.g., x ∈ X. Classes are primarily governed
by two axioms:
Axiom of Class Extensionality:
(4) ∀X∀Y(∀x(x ∈ X ↔ x ∈ Y)→ X = Y)
Predicative Class Comprehension:
(5) ∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ A), where A has no bound class variables.23
Predicative class comprehension generates a class for each condition A
that quantifies exclusively over urelements and sets. BGU incorporates
the pair, union, and power set axioms of ZFCU as well as standard
axioms of foundation, and infinity. Replacement becomes a single ax-
iom from which separation follows.24 The axiom of choice is not part
of BGU. We will, in addition, consider an axiom of global choice (GC)
according to which there is a functional relation F selecting exactly one
element from each non-empty set, e.g., if x is non-empty, then F(x) ∈ x.
Given the vocabulary of classes, we are in a better position to reg-
iment the Cantorian conception of absolute infinity. Cantor’s “transfi-
nite multiplicities” correspond to infinite sets, whereas his “absolutely
22. Fraenkel et al. (1973) introduce two-sorted axiomatizations of the theory of
classes. In general, Mendelson (1997) discusses a general procedure to move
from one-sorted to two-sorted axiomatizations of the theory of classes.
23. As usual, we assume that the variable X doesn’t occur freely in the condi-
tion A. Likewise for subsequent comprehension principles.
24. Replacement states that if R is a functional relation, the range of R on a
set x is itself a set. A relational class R is a class of ordered pairs. The domain,
dom(R), is {x : ∃y〈x, y〉 ∈ R}. The range of F, ran(F), is {x : ∃y〈y, x〉 ∈ R}. F is
a functional relation iff R is a relational class such that for all x, y, z ∈ dom(F),
if 〈x, y〉 ∈ F and 〈x, z〉 ∈ F, then y = z.
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infinite multiplicities” correspond to “proper classes” failing to form
a set. The thought that absolutely infinite multiplicities represent an
“absolute quantitative maximum” motivates, for Cantor, the hypothe-
sis that A is a proper class if, and only if, the class Ω of all ordinals is
injectable into A, which we abbreviate: Ω  A.25 This is what Michael
Hallett calls Cantor’s projection postulate in (Hallett, 1986, p. 171):
Projection: A is a proper class iff Ω  A
Cantor’s projection postulate gives only partial expression to the Can-
torian thought that the absolutely infinite exemplifies an unsurpass-
able magnitude incapable of any further increase. However, John von
Neumann offered his own interpretation of the Cantorian heuristic in
terms of one-one correspondence or equinumerosity. In what follows,
we often abbreviate the claim that a class A is equinumerous with an-
other class B as: A ∼ B:
Maximality: A is a proper class only if A ∼ V.
Since proper classes are absolutely infinite, they are all equinumerous
with the universal class V.
There is one important respect in which von Neumann’s maximal-
ity principle outstrips Cantor’s projection postulate: choice is indepen-
dent from Projection but directly derivable from Maximality in BG.26
However, choice is all that is required to derive Maximality from Pro-
jection in BG. It is not difficult to check that the equivalence between
25. A functional class F is an injection of A into B iff dom(F) = A, ran(F) ⊆ B,
and for all x, y ∈ dom(F), F(x) = F(y) iff x = y.
26. (Hallett, 1986, pp. 172-173) reports that Projection doesn’t entail choice over
BG. The axioms of choice, union, and replacement are all deductive conse-
quences of Maximality in BG.
Maximality and Projection plus choice carries over to the case of BGU
plus the Urelement Set Axiom.27
The absence of the Urelement Set Axiom severs the equivalence
between Maximality and Projection plus choice over BGU.28 But the
Cantorian doctrine of absolute infinity fits well with the weaker hy-
pothesis that the class U of all urelements is injectable into Ω: U  Ω.
We know, by the Burali-Forti paradox, that Ω is absolutely infinite.29
Let Cardinal Comparability (CC) be the hypothesis that if A and B are
two classes, then one is injectable into the other.30 In the presence of
CC, the Cantorian doctrine that there is only one absolutely infinite
magnitude suggests the existence of an injection of U into Ω. And, in
fact, Maximality is provably equivalent to GC over BGU + U  Ω.31
3. Recombination and paradox
We have suggested that the real problem with modal plenitude is that
it conflicts with the Cantorian doctrine of the absolutely infinite. We
now argue that the difficulty arises quite independently from a pleni-
tudinous commitment to merely possible concrete objects.
27. Proofs of this and related facts have been relegated to an appendix.
28. This related to Proposition 4 in Kanamori (2004) according to which Max-
imality is satisfied in a normal domain 〈⋃Uκ ,∈ ⋃Uκ〉 iff |U| ≤ κ. To each
normal domain model of ZFCU, there corresponds a model of BGU in which
we let class variables range over the power set of the normal domain. Therefore,
there are models of Projection and choice in which Maximality fails.
29. The crucial observation behind the Burali-Forti paradox is that the order-
type of each set of ordinals less or equal to α well-ordered by < is strictly
greater than α. So, if Ω formed a set, then, since it is well-ordered by <, an
ordinal would have to correspond to it greater than any ordinal in Ω.
30. See Linnebo (2010) for discussion.
31. It is not difficult to check that GWO entails CC, and as noted in the Ap-
pendix, CC turns out to be equivalent to GWO over BGU + Urelement Set
Axiom. I do not know what is the statues of CC in the absence of the latter
axiom.
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3.1 How many concrete objects could there have been?
Consider the question of how many concrete objects there could have
been. Could there have been exactly two concrete objects in existence?
Maybe not for a philosopher for whom the axioms of classical mereol-
ogy amount to necessary generalizations over the concrete.32 But even
if one is prepared to rule out two, or fourteen, or ℵ0 as possible cardi-
nalities for the concrete, it seems harder to deny that there could have
been a strictly larger set of concrete objects in existence:
(RC3) For every cardinal κ, there is a larger cardinal λ such that it is
possible that there are exactly λ concrete objects.
This principle enjoys at least as much general appeal as its predeces-
sors. For to deny it again is to hold that some cardinal number κ sets an
absolute upper bound on the cardinality a set of concrete objects could
have: necessarily, if the concrete objects compose a set, then it must
have cardinality strictly less than κ.33 However, it would certainly be
incredible to claim that there could be at most a finite set of concrete
objects in reality. Nor would it seem much better to claim that there
is some transfinite cardinal, κ, such that there could be a set of exactly
κ concrete objects in existence but not a set of more concrete objects.
What could explain such an extraordinary constraint on what is pos-
sible for the realm of the concrete? It would be different of course if
the constraint were to flow from the nature of the concrete, e.g., from
abstract constraints on the structure of spacetime and the assumption
that concrete objects must have spatiotemporal location. Indeed, some
might even be encouraged by Lewis’ own qualification of the official
recombination principle in Lewis (1986) by means of a “size and shape
32. This consequence of classical mereology is discussed by Comesaña (2008).
In fact, a model of classical mereology is a complete Boolean algebra without
a zero element. But if κ is the cardinality of an infinite complete Boolean alge-
bra, then κ = κℵ0 , which immediately rules out cardinals of cofinality ω. See
Koppelberg (1981).
33. The mere possibility of a proper class of concrete objects is not sufficient to
satisfy the constraint set by (RC3).
permitting” clause. Unfortunately, no such constraints seem relevant
to the original question once we take seriously the possibility of cohab-
itation: if concrete objects could jointly cohabit a region of space, then
it looks like no absolute upper bound on the cardinality of the concrete
can be motivated purely by constraints on the structure of spacetime.
Before we introduce the puzzle, it may be helpful to note that the
argument may be regimented in the framework of a modal extension
of BGU. We would, first, extend the language of first-order BGU with
a monadic predicate, C, read: “is concrete” and a modal operator, 2A,
read: “it is necessary that A”—and its dual, A (for ¬2¬A), read: “it
is possible that A”. The modal operator is governed by the axioms of
the minimal propositional modal logic K.34 The interaction of propo-
sitional modal logic and the axioms of classical quantificational logic
immediately yield the Converse Barcan Formula:
(CBF) 2 ∀x A→ ∀x 2 A
and the Necessary Necessity of Existence:
(NNE)2 ∀x 2 ∃y x = y.35
Neither consequence is particularly attractive by the lights of an ab-
stractionist interpretation of (). Fortunately, for the abstractionist, they
are avoided, for example, if one restricts the axioms of quantificational
logic in the manner suggested by Kripke (1963). So, the argument
could be regimented against the background of a formalization of BGU
in a free quantified modal logic.
34. This axiom system contains all instances of axiom K:
K(A→ B)→ (KA→ KB)
and the rule of necessitation:
From A, infer 2A.
35. In addition to them, the Barcan Formula (BF) becomes provable as soon as
one assumes axiom schema B: A→ 23A.
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On to the argument now, call a cardinal κ a live cardinal if and
only if there could be a set of exactly κ concrete objects. In symbols:
“3 ∃s(∀x(x ∈ s ↔ Cx) ∧ card(s) = κ)”. We now record two important
features of live cardinals to which we appeal later.
The first feature of live cardinals comes as a consequence of recom-
bination. Since a cardinal is an initial von Neumann ordinal, given
(RC3), we have that the live cardinals form an unbounded class of von
Neumann ordinals. Therefore:
(C∞) There is a proper class of live cardinals.
The second feature is based on familiar Cantorian considerations:
(C∞+ ) There are strictly more classes of live cardinals than there are
live cardinals.
This is a direct consequence of the Cantorian lemma:
Cantorian Lemma: A class A has more subclasses than members.
The Cantorian lemma needs to be unpacked with care. It is supposed
to generalize Cantor’s theorem that a set a has strictly more subsets
than elements. However, when unfolded, the latter involves an explic-
itly comparison of cardinality between a set a and its powerset Pa.
Unlike sets, classes are never members and there is never opportunity
to collect all subclasses of a class A into another class. So, whatever
the gloss, the Cantorian lemma had better not involve a comparison of
cardinality between two classes. Fortunately, Bernays (1942) explained
how to mimic the statement that a class has more subclasses than mem-
bers within BG.
Bernays’ theorem encodes the claim that given a class A, there is
“class-valued function” from A onto all subclasses of A. But this is only
a first pass, since it is not clear how to make sense of a “class-valued
function” in the framework of BG. Since classes are never members,
they cannot appear in an ordered pair. No matter, Bernays simulates a
“class-valued function" from A to subclasses of A by means of a binary
relational class R on A: in particular, we take R to map a member a
of A to the class of members of A to which a is related, i.e., {x ∈ A :
〈a, x〉 ∈ R}, which is itself a subclass of A. We may even write R(a) = B
to abbreviate: ∀x(〈a, x〉 ∈ R ↔ x ∈ B). Bernays’ generalization of
Cantor’s theorem is merely the observation that no binary relational
class R on A can simulate a class-valued function from members of A
onto subclasses of A: given a binary relational class R on A, there is, on
pain of contradiction, some subclass D of A such that no member d of
A is such that R(d) = D.
Proposition 3.1 (BG(U)) No binary relational class R on a class A simulates
a class-valued function from members of A onto subclasses of A.
Proof Let R be a binary relation on A, and consider the class D =
{x ∈ a : 〈x, x〉 /∈ R}, which exists by predicative class comprehension.
Now, there is no member d of A such that R(d) = D. Otherwise, if a
member d of A is such that R(d) = D, then 〈d, d〉 ∈ R iff d ∈ D iff
〈d, d〉 /∈ R.
Notice that Bernays’ proof involves only an instance of predicative
class comprehension, and it is therefore a theorem of BG(U). The result
may seem perplexing considering the availability of interpretations of
BG(U) on which there are no more classes than there are sets.36 But
while the proof of Bernays’ theorem does not require impredicative
class comprehension, the link with the Cantorian lemma does presup-
pose it: if no relational class R simulates a map from members of A
onto subclasses of A, then, given impredicative class comprehension,
we know that no formula Φ(x, y) can simulate such a map.37
36. If κ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal, we could take the set variables of the
language to range over Vκ and we could let the class variables of the language
to range over the set De f (Vκ) of definable subsets of Vκ .
37. Many thanks are due to Øystein Linnebo for this observation. We discuss
the link between Bernays’ theorem and the Cantorian lemma in more detail in
section 5.2.
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3.2 Modal comprehension principles
We focus on weak modal comprehension principles for proposi-
tions, but structurally analogous forms of comprehension for possible
worlds, properties or states of affairs would have done as well. We have
only chosen to look at the case of propositions in order to facilitate the
comparison between the challenge from recombination and more tradi-
tional threats of paradox such as Russell’s paradox of propositions or
Kaplan’s paradox. The main line of argument, however, can be trans-
posed mutatis mutandis to other categories of abstract objects.
In what follows, we regiment a principle of modal comprehension
for propositions in a three-sorted extension of BGU supplemented with
third style of variable for propositions, p, q, ..., a propositional truth
predicate T, and a modal operator 2.38 For a first pass at a principle of
modal propositional comprehension, consider:
Comp ∃p2(Tp↔ A).
The schema is designed to secure, for each sentence A, the existence
of a proposition p which, necessarily, is true if, and only if, A obtains.
On a possible worlds framework governed by (3), the schema makes
sure that the truth conditions of the proposition p track the truth value
of A across possible worlds. For example, if A is the statement that
exactly three propositions are true, then Comp yields the existence of
a proposition p, which, necessarily, is true if, and only if, exactly three
propositions are true.
The impredicative nature of Comp is overkill for our purposes. So,
we weaken the schema in one important respect: we need only assume
ultrapredicative instances of Comp in which A contains no propositional
variables at all. We thereby make sure to generate exclusively propo-
sitions concerned with strictly extensional matters such as the cardi-
nality of the concrete. The restriction isn’t motivated by concerns with
38. It is a three-sorted language because we have three different styles of ob-
jectual variables for different categories of objects such as members of classes,
classes, and propositions.
impredicativity but merely made for purposes of bookkepping. The
challenge from recombination requires only ultrapredicative instances
of propositional comprehension:
UComp ∃p2(Tp↔ A), where A contains no propositional variables.
The ultrapredicative restriction of modal propositional comprehension
is all we need in order to generate propositions concerned with such
extensional matters such as the cardinality of the concrete. If A is the
statement that there are exactly three concrete objects, then UComp
yields the existence of a proposition p, which, necessarily, is true if,
and only if, there are exactly three concrete objects.
3.3 Two absolutely infinite magnitudes
We now look at instances of UComp of the form:
(6) ∃p2(Tp↔ ∃x(x = card(C) ∧ x ∈ X)),
where ∃x(x = card(C) ∧ x ∈ X) is an open formula in which the
class variable X occurs free. Given a class of cardinals A, relative to
an assignment α on which α(X) = A, (6) guarantees the existence of
a proposition p, which, necessarily, is true if, and only if, the concrete
objects form a set whose cardinality is a member of A. In a possible
worlds framework governed by (3), the truth conditions of the propo-
sition tracks the truth value of the statement that the concrete objects
form a set whose cardinality is a member of A across possible worlds.
(7) For every class of cardinals A, there is a proposition p, which,
necessarily, is true iff there is a set of concrete objects whose
cardinality is a member of A.
To ease exposition, we write that p tracks a class of cardinals A if, and
only if, necessarily, p is true if, and only if, the concrete objects form a
set whose cardinality is a member of A. Notice that (7) only states that
the class of cardinal numbers A is tracked by some proposition. This,
however, is perfectly consistent with the hypothesis that one and the
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same proposition can track two different classes of cardinal numbers.
Consider a coarse-grained account of propositions on which one iden-
tifies necessarily equivalent propositions: if neither 2, nor 14, nor 22
are live cardinals, then the impossible proposition will track both the
class {2, 14} and the class of {14, 22}.
Matters are importantly different when we restrict attention to
classes of live cardinals:
(8) If two propositions p and q respectively track two classes of live
cardinals A and B, then p = q only if A and B are coextensive.
The reason is simple. If two classes of live cardinals A and B are not
coextensive, then at least one live cardinal κ is a member of one but not
the other. Without loss of generality, we may assume that κ ∈ A but
κ /∈ B. Since κ is a live cardinal, it is possible that the concrete objects
form a set of cardinality κ and not a set of cardinality λ. So, it is pos-
sible for p to obtain without q obtaining. This means that p and q are
different propositions after all: identical propositions are necessarily
equivalent!39
We are led to the conclusion that there are strictly more proposi-
tions than there are live cardinals. The combination of (7) and (8) tells
us that there are no fewer propositions than classes of live cardinals.
But (C∞+ ) states that there are more classes of live cardinals than there
are live cardinals. Since, by (C∞), there is an absolutely infinite class of
live cardinals, there are at least two absolutely infinite magnitudes. It
follows that von Neumann’s interpretation of the Cantorian doctrine
is violated again.
39. This falls out of a principle of indiscernibility of identicals for propositions.
4. The traditional threat of paradox
Given ultrapredicative instances of modal propositional comprehen-
sion, a principle of recombination like (RC3) generates such a vast
abundance of abstract objects that we are in a position to replicate
the conflict with the Cantorian doctrine of the absolutely infinite. One
may be tempted to respond that the difficulty pales in comparison with
more familiar sources of anxiety with (3), which has been thought
to lead to plain inconsistency, never mind a tension with the Canto-
rian doctrine of absolute infinity. Two problems that immediately come
to mind are based on Russell’s paradox of propositions and Kaplan’s
paradox. We now argue that each problem requires further resources
beyond the minimal assumptions outlined above. Russell’s paradox of
propositions requires propositions to be sufficiently fine-grained, and
Kaplan’s paradox requires impredicative instances of modal proposi-
tional comprehension.40
4.1 Russell’s paradox of propositions
In Appendix B, Russell (1903) records the observation that the follow-
ing three principles are inconsistent:
(R1) For each class of propositions C, there is a proposition pC, e.g.,
every proposition in C is true, which is associated with it.
(R2) If C and D are two different classes of propositions, then pC is
different from pD.
(R3) There is a class of propositions R, which consists of all and only
propositions p such that p = pC for some class of propositions
C such that p /∈ C.
40. Some of the material in this section overlaps with the discussion of Russell’s
paradox of propositions and Kaplan’s paradox in Uzquiano (2015a).
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The argument is impeccable.41 What is less clear is what to make
of it. For (R2) has very little plausibility given a coarse-grained stan-
dard for the individuation of propositions. If necessarily equivalent
propositions are in fact identical, then even if p and q are two different
propositions, {p,¬p} and {q,¬q} will be two classes to which one and
the same proposition corresponds, namely, the impossible proposition.
And you may even take Russell’s paradox of propositions to place a
constraint on how fine-grained propositions can be.42
The appeal to coarseness of grain may likewise be used to block
other variants on Russell’s argument against the coherence of (3).43 To
rehearse a version of the problem, notice that while proponents of (3)
often they differ as to how best to conceive of propositions, they often
agree on two minimal constraints on worlds and propositions:
(P1) Each proposition p has a negation ¬p.
(P2) If p is a proposition and w is a possible world, then either p is
true at w or ¬p is true at w.
Call a class C of propositions maximal if, and only if, for each propo-
sition p, either p is a member of C or ¬p is a member of C. And call
a class C of propositions compossible if, and only if, it is possible that
every proposition in C is true. Given (P1) and (P2), (3) leads to:
(P3) If w is a possible world, then the propositions that are true at w
form a maximal compossible class of propositions.
41. If R is the class of propositions described by (R3), let pR be the proposition
associated with it, which exists by (R1). First, observe that pR ∈ R: otherwise,
pR would thereby meet a sufficient condition for membership in R. Second,
since pR ∈ R, by definition of R, pR = pC for some class C to which pR does
not belong. Since pR ∈ R, C 6= R, which contradicts (R2).
42. This is the line explored in Uzquiano (2015b).
43. (Divers, 2002, pp. 243-245) discusses the general style of argument.
The trouble again is that four principles are inconsistent:
(M1) There is a maximal compossible class M of propositions.
(M2) For each class C of propositions in M, there is a proposition pC
associated with C, e.g., the proposition that every proposition in
C is true.
(M3) If C and D are different classes of propositions in M, then the
four propositions pC, ¬pC, pD, and ¬pD are pairwise different.
(M4) There is a class of all propositions p in M such that p is either
pC or ¬pC for some class C of propositions in M.
The argument mimics Russell’s derivation of the contradiction.44 But
notice that (M3) is no more plausible than (R2) above: there is no rea-
son to expect the relevant propositions to be pairwise different if, for
example, one identifies necessarily equivalent propositions.
The crucial observation for our purposes is that the argument from
recombination makes no appeal to the fineness of grain of proposi-
tions. When we argued that two propositions p and q track different
live cardinals—or classes thereof—only if the live cardinals—or classes
thereof—are different, we relied only on a the indiscernibility of iden-
tical propositions and made no demands whatever on the standard for
the individuation of propositions.
44. By (M2), consider the proposition pR associated with the class R, which
exists by (M1) and (M4). We argue that both pR is a member of R and pR is
not a member of R. First, pR ∈ R, Otherwise, if pR /∈ R, then pR satisfies a
sufficient condition for membership to R, whence pR ∈ R. Now, that we know
that pR ∈ R, by definition of R, there is some class C of propositions in M such
that pR is either pC or ¬pC but pR is not a member of C. But since R and C
differ by at least one member, namely, pR, by (M3), pR is different from pC and
¬pC . Contradiction.
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4.2 Kaplan’s paradox
Kaplan’s paradox is supposed to raise a separate challenge for (3).
Kaplan (1995) observed that (A) is unsatisfiable against the background
of a possible worlds model theory for intensional logic:
(A) ∀p3(Qp ∧ ∀q(Qq↔ (p = q))).45
Kaplan seemed to conceive of this observation as a difficulty for the
standard possible worlds model theory for intensional logic because
logic alone, for him, should not adjudicate the status of (A). However,
Kaplan’s consideration has often been turned into a cardinality prob-
lem for (): if QA is interpreted to mean: “it is queried whether A”,
then if true, (A) would seem to require for each proposition p the pos-
sibility that p, and p alone, be queried. But since () posits a possible
world as a witness for each possibility, it requires at least as many pos-
sible worlds as propositions, which is impossible for familiar Cantorian
reasons.
The real problem with (A), however, is that it is plainly inconsistent.
To appreciate this, consider, first, a theorem of classical quantificational
propositional logic pointed out by Prior (1961):
(B) Q∀p(Qp→ ¬p)→ ∃q(Qq ∧ p) ∧ ∃q(Qq ∧ ¬q).
Prior read QA to mean: “it is asserted by a Cretan that A”, but his
observation carries over to the case at hand. Logic alone appears to
rule out the scenario in which the proposition all queried propositions
are false, and it alone, is queried.
45. A model generally interprets propositional quantification in terms of objec-
tual quantification over sets of possible worlds in the model. Since 3B is true at
a world in the model just in case B is true at some world in the model, the sat-
isfiability of (A) would require, for each set of possible worlds, a world to bear
witness to the possibility that the corresponding set of worlds, and it alone, be
in the extension of Q at a world. And this in turn is inconsistent with Cantor’s
theorem according to which there are strictly more sets of possible worlds than
there are possible worlds in the model.
The inconsistency of (A) is not far behind. An application of neces-
sitation in combination with the logic of propositional quantification
delivers the negation of a simple consequence of (A−):
(A−) ∀p3(Qp ∧ ∀q(Qq↔ (p↔ q))).46
There are two main lines of response to Kaplan’s paradox, but none
of them help in the least with the problem of recombination. One of
them is to reject the likes of (A) and (A−) as unattainable for strictly
logical reasons. Once we surrender such principles as inconsistent, it
should be no surprise that the principles turn out to be unsatisfiable.
This observation, however, is of no help whatever when it comes to the
problem from recombination.
The other line of response involves a retreat from classical quantifi-
cational propositional logic to a weaker quantificational propositional
logic motivated by a ramified vision of propositions on which they
are classified into various orders in accordance to their subject matter.
First, following Kaplan, we begin with propositions of level 0, which
are concerned with strictly extensional matters such as different dis-
tributions of earth, wind, fire, and water. Then we form propositions
of level 1, which are concerned with extensional matters and propo-
sitions of level 1. Then we form propositions of level 2, etc. Prior’s
theorem is then blocked by means of a restriction on universal instan-
tiation: a propositional variable of a given level may only range over
propositions of a lower level. Similar considerations now block the in-
consistency of (A−).
Now, ramification undermines the motivation for impredicative
modal propositional comprehension as stated by Comp, but it leaves
ultrapredicative instances of modal propositional comprehension un-
touched. For if A is condition in which no propositional variables occur,
then even by the lights of the ramified vision of propositions, A should
determine a proposition of level 0 concerned with strictly extensional
46. This fact is discussed in Uzquiano (2015a).
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matters. This means that the second line of response ot Kaplan’s para-
dox is powerless against ultrapredicative instances of modal proposi-
tional comprehension employed in the problem from recombination.
5. A tetralemma
What is to be learned from the challenge from recombination? We seem
to face an uncomfortable tetralemma, once we realize that there is a
conflict between four attractive thoughts:
A. Recombination: For each cardinal number κ, there is a larger car-
dinal λ such that it is possible that there are exactly λ concrete
objects.
B. Cantorian Lemma: A class has more subclasses than members.
C. Maximality: A is a proper class only if A ∼ V.
D. Ultrapredicative Modal Comprehension: To each ultrapredicative
condition A, there corresponds a proposition p which, neces-
sarily, is true iff A obtains.
We have only limited room for maneuver. One option is to take the
difficulty to refute the principle of recombination. Two more options
require us to reevaluate the evidence for the Cantorian lemma and von
Neumann’s interpretation of the Cantorian doctrine of the absolutely
infinite. One last option is to take the problem to refute the ultrapred-
icative restriction on propositional comprehension. However, none of
the attempted resolutions is cost-free.
5.1 Reject A: Pessimistic scepticism
One horn of the tetralemma turns the problem from recombination
into a discovery in modal metaphysics. What we have learned from
the conflict is that there is, in fact, some cardinal number κ such that
it is strictly impossible for the concrete to compose a set of cardinality
greater than κ. This places an absolute upper bound on the cardinality
that a set of concrete objects could have, even if it’s not one motivated
by reflection on the nature of the concrete. Nor do the Cantorian con-
siderations given above help identify a specific cardinal κ as a cutoff
on the series of possible cardinalities for a set of concrete objects. So,
while, on this horn of the tetralemma, Cantorian considerations hand
down to us a powerful reason to posit a cutoff, we are no closer to a
reason to prefer one to another. Wherever the cutoff is located, we face
the same threat of arbitrariness as before.
Maybe we should simply acknowledge that the location of the cut-
off is just a brute modal fact for which there is no informative explana-
tion to be had. If the cutoff is ℵ17, then we need to come to terms with
the fact that there just could not be a set of concrete objects of a greater
cardinality. This is a stable position, but it comes at a cost. Once we
posit unexplainable brute modal facts, we seem led to a form of pes-
simsitic scepticism according to which our ability to gain modal knowl-
edge is much more impoverished than one might have supposed.
5.2 Reject B: Bernays’ theorem without the Cantorian lemma
The Cantorian lemma played a crucial role in the problem, and it may
be identified as the weakest link by some philosophers. On the face of
it, the Cantorian lemma is grounded on a theorem: Bernays’ generaliza-
tion of Cantor’s theorem for classes. But one may still attempt to drive
a wedge between the letter of Bernays’ theorem and the claim that a
class has more subclasses than members. In particular, one may think
that whatever the moral of Bernays’ theorem, it is still compatible with
the existence of no more subclasses than members.
It is instructive to compare the situation with a second-order varia-
tion on Bernays’ theorem:
(9) ¬∃R∀X∃x∀y(Rxy↔ Xy)
This theorem states that no relation maps objects onto the values of
monadic second-order variables. And this is often glossed as the claim
that there are more values of monadic second-order variables than
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there are objects.47 However, a close look at the proof reveals that it
requires only instances of predicative second-order comprehension:
(10) ∃X∀x(Xx ↔ A), provided A contains no bound second-order
variables.
Now, let Predicative V (PV) be the theory axiomatized by predicative
second-order logic and Frege’s Axiom V:
(V) ∀X∀Y(ext(X) = ext(Y)↔ ∀x(Xx ↔ Yx)),48
where, as usual, ext(X) is supposed to denote the extension of X. Not
only is PV satisfiable, the range of monadic second-order variables is
no larger than the domain of first-order variables. Indeed, it is not
difficult to think of a binary condition that simulates a map of the latter
onto the former: y ∈ x. There is, however, no conflict with (9). When
suitably unpacked into primitive notation, y ∈ x becomes: ∃X(x =
ext(X)∧Xy), which contains a bound occurrence of X. This means that
predicative second-order comprehension does not, by itself, sanction
the existence of a relation R corresponding to the condition y ∈ x. So,
one may suggest that whatever the import of Bernays’ theorem, it’s
not that there are fewer objects than values of monadic second-order
variables.49
The example may now be taken to suggest that we should revisit
the import of Bernays’ theorem. The mere fact that no relational class
simulates a map of the latter onto the former is no conclusive reason
for the Cantorian lemma: the fact that there are no more subclasses of
A than members of A could still be witnessed by the existence of some
47. Shapiro (1991) offers just this gloss of the theorem.
48. The reader may consult chapter 2 of Burgess (2005) for some discussion of
this axiom system and its models.
49. Many thanks are due to Øystein Linnebo for the example and helpful dis-
cussion of its significance in the present context.
impredicative formula Φ(x, y), which can still simulate a map of the
latter onto the former even if it doesn’t determine a relational class.
One problem with this move is that it will be ineffectual, if you think
that there is no real room between the existence of a formula Φ(x, y)
of the sort mentioned above and the existence of a relational class gen-
erated by it. The gap can be closed, for example, by the impredicative
class comprehension schema, which looks almost irresistible on the
plural interpretation of class talk. This is not the place to argue for the
intelligibility of impredicative class comprehension, but it is hard to
see how the present predicament could, by itself, be the only reason to
retreat to predicative class comprehension. So, the move will only be
available to philosophers with independent grounds for advocating a
predicative restriction on class comprehension principles.50
5.3 Reject C: More than one absolutely infinite magnitude
Another horn of the tetralemma reverses the direction of discovery and
allows for the mathematical theory of the infinite to be informed by
modal metaphysics. The Cantorian doctrine of the absolutely infinite
must be amended in order to accommodate more than one absolutely
infinite magnitude.
We know that von Neumann’s interpretation of the doctrine is
equivalent, over BGU, to the combination of global choice and the
claim that there are no more urelements than ordinal numbers, i.e.,
U  Ω.51 But maybe we could take the challenge from recombination
to show that there are strictly more propositions than ordinals. And if
propositions are urelements, then this refutes the hypothesis that U is
injectable into Ω.
50. Linnebo (2010), for example, proposes a parallel restriction on appropriately
modalized versions of plural comprehension principles.
51. This is Proposition 2 in the Appendix.
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But in the presence of Cardinal Comparability, the claim that U  Ω
appears to be in conflict with the spirit of the Cantorian doctrine. For if
U  Ω, then Ω  U, which would suggest that U does in fact outstrip
Ω. Now, Ω is certainly absolutely infinite, since to suppose otherwise
yields a contradiction via the Burali-Forti paradox. So, if U outstrips Ω,
then there are at least two absolutely infinite magnitudes.52 We have
no choice but to amend the Cantorian doctrine to allow for more than
one absolutely infinite magnitude.
The amendment comes at a cost. One motivation for the thesis that
U is injectable into Ω relies not to the assumption that U must consist
of just a few elementary particles or regions of spacetime but rather
on the thought that Ω is an incredibly rich structure, one which is suf-
ficiently rich and varied to contain representations of the order-types
of arbitrary well-orderings of classes of urelements. If some subclass T
of U is well-ordered by some relational class R, then one may use an
injection of U into Ω in order to construct an isomorphism between
T under R and some initial segment of Ω under <. If T under R is
isomorphic to some proper initial segment of Ω, then it will be repre-
sented by 〈α,<〉; otherwise, we will make do with Ω under <.
There is a second motivation, which proceeds from the assumption
the Cantorian generation of ordinals proceeds completely unencum-
bered by the nature of U as far as it is conceivable. This is admit-
tedly vague, but it should at least enable us to rule out as unintended
a model M of BGU in which ΩM—the interpretation of “Ω” in the
model—is isomorphic to a proper initial segment of ΩN—the interpre-
tation of “Ω” in another model N of BGU. The intended models of
BGU should let the generation of ordinals proceed as far as possible. So,
in general, we should expect Ω not to be isomorphic to a proper initial
52. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that even when set theorists allow
for a proper class of urelements, they never ever posit more urelements than
ordinals. (For specific examples, the reader may consult Barwise and Moss
(1996), Friedman (2004), and Rubin and Rubin (1985).) But this merely speaks
to the extent to which the Cantorian conception of the absolutely infinite has
been internalized by set theorists.
segment of ΩM, where M is a model of BGU.53 The claim that U is in-
jectable into Ω makes sure that there is no model M of BGU in which
ΩM—the interpretation of “Ω” in the model—contains an isomorphic
copy of Ω—the complete ordinal series—as a proper initial segment.
So, there is a clear sense in which the generation of ordinals couldn’t
have proceeded further than it did.
5.4 Reject D: Against reification
The final horn of the tetralemma involves the formulation of modal
propositional comprehension, which could be rejected on the grounds
that propositions should not be reified as individual objects. The prob-
lem with Comp− lies in the presupposition that propositions lie in the
range of objectual variables.
There are at least two different strategies to consider, though only
one of them holds some promise. The first strategy begins with the
observation that propositions are often conceived as classes of possi-
ble worlds, e.g., Stalnaker (1976). So, if, in line with the official stance
of the paper, we reject the reification of classes as individual objects,
then there is no reason to think that propositions can be collected into
classes in order to supply a counterexample to von Neumann’s max-
imality principle. The problem with this line of response is that it re-
mains powerless when it comes to other forms of the challenge for
separate categories of abstract object governed by appropriate modal
comprehension principles.
53. This is akin to (McGee, 1997, p. 54):
Completeness Principle: The pure sets are not isomorphic to a proper initial segment
of the “pure sets” of any other model of second-order ZFCU.
This follows from the Urelement Set Axiom, but the argument carries over
mutatis mutandis to the hypothesis that U  Ω.
philosophers’ imprint - 16 - vol. 999, no. 999 (july 2015)
gabriel uzquiano Recombination and paradox
To make the point vivid, consider the case of ways the world might
be. Kripke (1980), for example, conceives of possible worlds as states
of the world, which correspond to complete or maximally specific ways
the world might be Stalnaker (1976). So conceived, ways the world
might be are nothing but properties, which can be instantiated by the
universe under various circumstances. In a suitable extension of BGU
equipped with variables over ways and an instantiation predicate, I,
we have a modal comprehension principle for ways the world might be:
(11) ∃w2(Iw↔ A).
This principle generates, for each condition A, a way the world might
be, which, necessarily, is instantiated by the total universe iff A ob-
tains. There is, for example, a way the world might be, which, neces-
sarily, is instantiated iff snow is white. Indeed, this is, in fact, a (partial)
way the total universe is. There is, likewise, a way the world might be,
which, necessarily, is instantiated iff donkeys talk. The challenge from
recombination may now be recreated by appeal only to ultrapredica-
tive instances of (11) in which A is concerned with purely extensional
matters. So, if ways the world might be are, in fact, individual objects
in the range of our objectual variables, then we have made no progress
whatever.
The more radical strategy is to draw a Fregean distinction be-
tween objectual quantification and quantification over predicate posi-
tion. Even if the universe is an individual object in the range of objec-
tual variables, ways the universe might be are not; instead, they are to
be found in the range of predicate variables. In this respect, they are
rather like first-level Fregean concepts over which predicate variables
range.54 Propositions could likewise be conceived as values of zero-
place predicate variables governed by an appropriate form of modal
comprehension:
54. They cannot quite be Fregean concepts because Frege went on to identify
coextensive concepts.
(12) ∃p2(p↔ A).
The key difference between Comp and the present form of compre-
hension is that p is no longer treated as an objectual variable, but
is rather a propositional variable occupying sentence position. While
modal propositional comprehension still gives rise to a bewildering
abundance of propositions, it would be misconceived to use this great
wealth of propositions to mount a counterexample to von Neumann’s
maximality principle. Strictly speaking, only individual objects are
members of classes. But the Cantorian doctrine of the absolutely in-
finite is exclusively concerned with classes of individual objects and
has no bearing whatever when it comes to items in the range of pred-
icate or sentence variables. More generally, the challenge from recom-
bination only arises when we ignore the fundamental rift between the
values of objectual variables and the values of predicate and sentence
variables. While the quantifiers of BGU range over absolutely all ob-
jects, whether urelements or sets, propositions are neither and, as a
result, they lie outside the scope of the framework.
We can, if we like, make sense of cardinality comparisons between
items drawn from different ontological categories: there is still a clear
sense in which there are strictly more propositions than ordinals.55 But
this is no more surprising than the realization that there are strictly
more first-level Fregean concepts than there are objects, which is often
taken to be the moral of Russell’s paradox. We can, in fact, verify that
there are in general strictly more Fregean concepts of level n + 1 than
there are Fregean concepts of level n.56
This line of response is not without costs. Possible worlds and
propositions are standardly taken to lie in the range of objectual vari-
ables, and they are commonly collected into sets. But if possible worlds,
55. Think of an assignment of ordinals to propositions as given by a second-
level binary predicate which takes a propositional variable and an individual
variable as arguments: no assignment maps all propositions onto the ordinals.
56. In each case, we take an assignment of nth-level concepts to n + 1th-level
concepts to be given by a n + 2th-level relational concept taking appropriate
predicate variables as arguments.
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for example, are identified with states of the world, which, in turn, lie
in the range of first-level predicate variables, then apparent quantifica-
tion over sets of worlds should be analyzed in terms of quantification
over second-level predicates under which first-level predicates fall. The
claim that the actual world state is a member of the set of world states
in which snow is white would be akin to the claim that the actual
world state falls under a certain second-order level concept, i.e., one
under which a world-state falls iff necessarily, it is instantiated iff snow
is white. Not that the translation is particularly difficult to achieve in
this case, but it is not trivial to generalize the procedure to deal with
other cases.57
6. Conclusion
We have argued that a generally attractive recombination principle
raises a distinctive challenge for different accounts of modality on
which what is possible is explained in terms of what is the case at
one world or another. The problem, in particular, requires a differ-
ent set of resources from the ones generally employed in more tra-
ditional sources of anxiety with possible worlds and propositions. We
have identified at least four different lines of response to the difficulty
and while all seem costly, we have tentatively advocated the view that
propositions—or possible worlds, for that matter—should not be con-
ceived as objects.58
57. The techniques developed in Linnebo and Rayo (2012) help with more gen-
eral cases.
58. I’m grateful to audiences at OSU, Arizona State University, the University
of Barcelona, UCLA, the University of St Andrews, and the Ranch Metaphysics
Workshop, where I presented earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks are
due to Kris McDaniel, Øystein Linnebo, and two anonymous referees for very
helpful comments and discussion.
7. Appendix
Definition. Four class-theoretic choice principles.
(i) GC (Global Choice): There is a global choice function F such
that F(x) ∈ x for each x 6= ∅.
(ii) GWO (Global Well-Ordering): There is a global well-ordering R
of V.
(iii) Max (Maximality): A is a proper class only if A ∼ V.
(iv) Proj (Projection): A is a proper class only if Ω  A.
(v) CC (Cardinal Comparability): Given two classes A and B, A  B
or B  A.
Proposition 1 We have the following entailments over BGU + the Ure-
lement Set Axiom:
(a) GWO is equivalent to GC.
(b) GWO is equivalent to Max
(c) Max entails Proj + Axiom of Choice
(d) Proj + Axiom of Choice entails GWO
(e) CC entails Proj + Axiom of Choice
GC oo // GWO
{{
oo // Max
xx
CC // Proj + AC
ff
Proof. By the Urelement Set Axiom, there is a set U of all the ure-
lements. We now define the cumulative hierarchy by transfinite recur-
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sion on the ordinals:
U0 = U;
Uα+1 = Uα ∪ P(Uα);
Uλ =
⋃
α<λ
Uα, for λ a limit ordinal.
The axiom of foundation makes sure that for every object x—whether
an urelement or a set—there is some ordinal α such that x ∈ Uα. Define
the rank of an object a, ρ(a), to be the least α such that x ∈ Uα.
(a) See (Rubin and Rubin, 1963, Theorem 1.2S, and 2.3S).
(b) This follows from an observation made in von Neumann (1928).
See (Rubin and Rubin, 1963, Theorem 1.1S).
(c) By the Burali-Forti paradox, Ω is a proper class, and, given Max,
Ω ∼ V. So, if A is a proper class, then, given Max again, A ∼ V,
whence Ω  A. As for choice, given Max, we have, by (b), that
some relational class R well-orders V. So, if m is a family of
disjoint non-empty sets, we define a choice function f where
f (x) is the R-least element of x, for each element x of m.
(d) The axiom of choice guarantees that each Uα is well-ordered
by some relation R. So, we need now only consider the class
W = {R : ∃α R well-orders Uα}. W is a proper class, since a well-
ordering of Uα is different from a well-ordering of Uβ whenever
α 6= β. By Proj, we have that Ω W. Notice, in addition, that for
each α, there is a set Wα of all well-orderings of Uα, which, by
choice again, can be well-ordered. We now define a global well-
ordering R of the universe: 〈x, y〉 ∈ R iff either ρ(x) < ρ(y) or
else if α = ρ(x) = ρ(y), x precedes y in the least well-ordering
of Uα according to some well-ordering of Wα.
(e) Let A be a proper class. Then, by CC, A  Ω or Ω  A. We
are done if Ω  A. Assume A  Ω. Since A is a proper class,
an injection from A into Ω must be cofinal in Ω. But now, we
may map an ordinal α to the least member of A not assigned to
an ordinal less than α in the order induced by the injection of A
into Ω. This gives an injection of Ω into A. As for choice, notice
that, by CC, every set is injectable into Ω. So, every set can be
well-ordered.
Proposition 2. Max is equivalent to GC over BGU + U  Ω.
The crucial lemma is the observation that an injection between U
and Ω gives rise to an injection between the universal class V and the
class Π of pure sets. If U is a set, then, by choice, we are done. Assume
that U is a proper class. By transfinite recursion on the ordinals, define
a class-valued function R:
R(0) = U;
R(α+ 1) = R(α) ∪ {x : x ⊆ R(α)};
R(λ) =
⋃
α<λ
R(α), for λ a limit ordinal.
(Rubin and Rubin, 1985, p. xxiv) prove that for every object x, there is
some ordinal α such that x ∈ R(α) from a class form of foundation.59
Much like before, define the rank of an object a, ρ(a), to be the least α
such that x ∈ R(α). For each α, Vα ⊆ R(α), where Vα is stage α in the
hierarchy of pure sets.
Now, given an injection I of U into Ω, we define an injection J of V
into the class Π of pure sets by induction on rank:
J(x) = 〈I(x),∅〉, if x is an urelement.
J(x) = 〈{J(y) : y ∈ x}, {∅}〉, if x is a set.
59. This is Theorem 0.8 (b) in (Rubin and Rubin, 1985, p. xxiv). The class form
of foundation states that every non-empty class A contains a set a as a member
such that a ∩ A = ∅.
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So, if A ⊆ V, then A is injectable into the class of pure sets Π.
The arguments for (a) and (b) may be adapted to show that Max
entails GC over BGU + U  Ω. To move from GC to Max in the present
context, notice that if A ⊆ V is a proper class, then, by the preceding
lemma, A is injectable into Π, and, in particular, A is equinumerous
with some Q ⊆ Π. By replacement, Q must itself be a proper class. As
a special case of Proposition 1 when U = ∅ and V = Π, GC gives
us that each of Q and Ω ∼ Π. So, A ∼ Ω and all proper classes are
equinumerous to each other.
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